📄 Abstract
This theoretical article examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and bank financial stability. Because banks are characterized by high leverage, informational opacity, the interests of depositors and systemic importance, their corporate governance differs fundamentally from that of ordinary firms. Drawing on agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and information-asymmetry theory, the article systematizes the channels through which corporate governance affects financial stability, namely board effectiveness, ownership structure, risk governance, transparency and incentives. The contested nature of this relationship — in particular the tendency of strongly shareholder-oriented governance to increase risk-taking under deposit insurance — is analyzed in the light of the 2008 global financial crisis. In the context of Uzbekistan’s banking system, the governance models of state-owned and private banks are compared, and a conceptual model together with a set of recommendations is proposed.
🏷️ Keywords
📚 How to Cite:
Gaybulloev Sukhrob , THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUALITY AND BANK FINANCIAL STABILITY , Volume 12 , Issue 6, June 2026, International Journal of Global Economic Light (JGEL) , Pages: 1 - 7 , DOI: https://doi.org/10.36713/epra30665